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ON THE QUESTION OF HOW SOCIAL 
RULES AND SOCIAL NORMS EXIST
abstract
The objective of this paper is to grasp the mode of being of social rules and norms. I begin by analyzing 
how mental representations of rules and norms structure social interaction. Then I demonstrate that 
the actual existence of rules and norms is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses mental 
and linguistic realization (linguistically expressed or habituated doxastic attitudes) as well as socially 
organized bindingness. I conclude that social rules and norms can be described merely by refering to 
dispositions and notions.
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ON THE QUESTION OF HOW SOCIAL RULES AND SOCIAL NORMS EXIST
What is the mode of being (modus existendi, mode d’être, Seinsweise) of social rules and norms? 
In order to answer that question, one needs to formulate a valid theoretical concept of the 
position social rules and norms have in the world. The purpose of this paper is to outline an 
answer by arguing that the existence of social rules and norms can be reduced to common 
dispositions and doxastic attitudes. In order to frame the existence of norms I shall elaborate a 
framework by relying on key lessons of relevant literature on that complex topic (in paragraph 
3).1 In particular, this paper contributes to the debate on the existence of rules and norms due 
to the concept of pragmatic roles of social rules and norms that is elaborated in paragraph 2. 
In what follows, I shall begin with a definition of the central concepts.    
Social rules and norms are common notions of right and bad conduct in all its varieties. They 
define what is proper or inappropriate, befitting or indecent, good or wrong, permissible 
or offensive, decent or obscene, prohibited or allowable, etc. Examples of social rules and 
norms are “The guests ought to leave if the host wants to go to bed” or “You ought not to 
interrupt a conversation” or “One ought to keep one’s position in the queue”. Ordinary 
language distinguishes between rules as explicit demands for action and norms as implicit, 
or habituated demands for action. This seems justified. Rules and norms differ in the degree 
in which they are present to the agent’s mind (epistemic presence), and rules typically are 
linguistically expressed in an explicit fashion whereas norms are typically unspoken and 
habituated (latent action potential). With the word epistemic presence, I describe the object of a 
doxastic attitude regarding its mental accessibility. The degree of epistemic presence is clear 
and distinct if I can distinguish it from other objects, and diffuse if I can recognize it. Explicit 
statements on appropriate conduct, i. e. rules, are transparent or lucid notions, they are clear 
and distinct. Notions about norms, in contrast, are diffuse or opaque, although they can be 
transformed into lucid notions. Such transformation takes place when one appeals to a norm 
in a practical manner, i. e. take it as a reason for justifying a demand. Then the norm, qua 
linguistic reminding, becomes lucid. However, norm-guided behavior (in the generic sense) 
refers to habituated action that is accompanied by opaque notions with a small degree of 
1  I selected the literature due to my (ontological) focus on mental, linguistic and dispositional realization of rules 
and norms. Because of this selection, I shall not discuss practical approaches to rules and norms, i. e. approaches that 
frame rules and norms as solutions for coordination- or cooperation-problems or as solutions for the distributions of 
goods in society. That is why such contributions as D. Lewis’ Convention (1969), E. Margalit-Ullmann’s The Emergence of 
Norms (1977), C. Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society (2006), or G. Brennan et al. Explaining Norms (2013), are ignored. 
1. The notion of 




epistemic presence. In contrast, a rule-guided behavior is accompanied by declaratory mental 
states, i. e. clear and assessable notions of the rule. 
Notions of right and bad conduct are common in at least two meanings. First, they are 
common in the sense that there is a general agreement without explicit consultation or 
discourse about them, i. e. they are accepted in ways of tacit consensus. And second, they are 
common in the sense that they are customary, i. e. they are spread massively throughout a 
community to the extent that any two strangers, for example, can agree in their normative 
assessment of conduct. Furthermore, it is a general attribute of such mores – for ages 
understood as tacitus consensus populi, longa consuetudine inveterans – that they are accompanied 
by social pressure. And indeed this, the pressure (the force or bindingness) with which they 
occur, makes them a social rule or a norm in the real and proper sense. 
The logical analysis provided by Siegwart (2010; 2012) shows that a rule in general expresses a 
conditionalized modalised action: If “Agents of the kind A are in a situation S”, then “A has to 
act in a m-fashioned manner”. It says that a particular class of people (the norm-addressees) 
are expected to execute or to omit a specific action (the focal action, modalized via deontic 
character) under specific conditions (situations). The same holds for norms, whereas the 
majority of social norms tells what to omit (and not what to do). Concerning that analysis, we 
say that social rules and norms are conditionalized practical guidances. 
Rule-guidance and norm-guidance are phenomena that are grounded in mental processes 
which are accompanied by representations. Everyone whose conduct is guided by a rule has a 
mental representation of that rule, i. e. (s)he is capable to tell which rule (s)he is following. The 
same is true for norm guided action. In cases of rule-following the epistemic presence of the 
guiding notion is more transparent than in cases of norm-following. The exception to this is 
the phenomenon of rule-following with any mental representation. The most obvious example 
for such blind rule-following is the use of grammatical rules in everyday conversation. 
However, the phenomenon of blind rule-following is ignored here. 
As mental representations, rules and norms have a grip on social interaction in at least 
five respects, whereby each refers to a pragmatic role. Such pragmatic roles show in which 
constellations in social life mental representations of rules or norms occur: in deliberation, 
in expectation, in demanding and in requesting, in rewarding and in punishing, and in 
evaluating. 
1) In a way, every conscious occurrence of a rule or norm is oriented towards future action, 
no matter whether it was brought to attention linguistically (in speech-based interaction) 
or whether it was reminded personally (in a situation of interaction without discourse). A 
rule or norm as a mental representation tells us how the world ought to be. But what ought 
to be is not yet the case. Indeed, what the rule or norm tells will be the case if the norm-
addressee adapts its will, i. e. its goals, accordingly. The diverse sources of motivation to 
follow a rule or norm (e.g. to avoid sanctions, to increase social esteem, or due to moral 
reasons) are ignored here. However, in general, a rule (and a norm alike) is called a reason 
for action if the action in question was motivated by that rule. The pragmatic role in 
question is well known to philosophers of action. Schauer (2002) for example states: 
p is a reason for S to do A if, and only if, p is a fact about A’s awareness of which by S, 
under conditions of rational consideration, would lead S to prefer his doing A to his not 
doing A, other things being equal (p. 112). 
If you ask a person why (s)he has acted in this particular situation the way (s)he did (and 
not otherwise), a possible and not uncommon answer is: Because there was this rule. A 
2. Pragmatic roles 
of social rules and 
norms 
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rule is motivationally effective if it operates on and manipulates what action-theory calls 
(the process of) deliberation and thus participated in the resulted action in a significant 
manner. As Conte/Castelfranchi (1995, p. 86; 2006) analyze: A rule manipulates individual 
goals. Furthermore, a rule or norm is motivationally effective if it operates on the agent’s 
mind, i. e. it overdrives the personal goals to that extent that the agent’s goals and the 
goals inscribed in the rule become identical, cf. Conte/Castelfranchi (1995, pp. 74-118; 1999; 
2006, pp. 504-508). Unfortunately, the name reason for action is slightly misleading. Iorio 
(2011, p. 171) corrects that primary reasons for action result from individual preferential 
deliberations, as Davidson (1980) shows. But a rule is not a product of individual 
preferential deliberations. If a rule motivates an action, then it gives a reason for action, 
but it is not a primary reason. To be precise, we can thus call a rule in this role a reason for 
deliberation. 
2) Another pragmatic role is the reason for expectation. A rule is a reason for expectation if 
a person anticipates the future conduct of another person on the cognitive basis of the 
rule in question. Anticipation here means that the rule in consciousness evokes a notion 
of future conduct (with or without visual imagination). The mental representation 
of that rule is the basis for two kinds of expectation: first-order (I expect that (s)he 
will do X in situation S) and second-order (I expect that they expect that I will do X in 
situation S). In this pragmatic role rules guide social interaction inasmuch as they give 
orientation knowledge with which its bearer predicts future behaviors of others (or other’s 
expectations towards him). This allows for communal life in general and individual action 
plans in particular, since the notion of a rule displays a typical conduct in typical situations 
and allows to predict how other people behave.
3) In another pragmatic role, a practical hint to a rule justifies normative demands, i. e. 
requests to follow a rule. If a person A requests another person B that (s)he ought to show 
a specific conduct and if B asked back why (s)he should do that, then the demanding one 
can refer to a rule to justify the demand. If a rule was used like this, then we can call it 
the reason for justification. Take as an example the rule for queues. If this rule justifies a 
demand (“Join the end of the queue, please!”) then it is the reason for justification. 
4) In a similar way, a rule is used to sanction. In a sequence of actions, a sanction is an 
ensuing action that is meant to punish an act of deviation. One must distinguish between 
the emotional states triggered by observed deviance (e. g. confusion, indignation, anger, 
disgust, etc.) from generally accepted sanctions of those deviations, e. g, roll one’s eyes, 
complaints, angry rebuke, invective, avoidance, etc. If someone sanctions the deviant 
conduct of another, then the mental representation of that rule is the reason for sanction. 
5) Again another pragmatic role is if a rule is taken as a measure to evaluate conduct. This 
results for example in propositions that it was laudable (or awful), praiseworthy (or 
hateful), correct (or mistaken), etc. A rule which is taken as a measure to discern whether 
conduct is right or wrong (and the like) is thus the reason for evaluation. 
I cannot give a principle to show that this list of pragmatic roles is complete. I can only 
state that it was developed using Charles Sanders Peirce’s maxim for definition: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of 
our conception of the object (CP 5.422). 
The conceivable practical bearings of rules and norms on social interaction are the ways in 
which they are used. Reconsidering their practical bearings on social interaction, rules and 
norms are indistinguishable. Although it is in need for an explanation how opaque mental 
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representations of appropriate conduct (norms) can occur in those pragmatic roles, it is 
undoubtedly the case that they do. I call this the identity of rules and norms in pragmatic 
respects. 
These insights into the pragmatic roles help to comprehend the distinction between using 
a rule and mentioning it, and thus allows us an clearer understanding of the pragmatic 
reality of rules and norms. As Black (1981) shows, one needs to distinguish between the 
act of denoting a rule (theoretical hint to a rule) from the act of using it (practical hint 
to a rule); otherwise, description and normativity are mixed up. If we talk about rules 
with descriptions, such as the rules of chess, the rules for queuing in supermarkets, the 
rules of conversation, etc., we always already have abstracted from real practical bearings 
and generalized a common practice thereby. In contrast, if a rule is truly used then the 
(intended) result is to change, manipulate, or measure conduct. If for example the queue-
rule or the conversation-rule appears in a pragmatic role, then this notion is intended 
to measure a deviance (you acted wrong), to justify a demand (get in line, resp. don’t 
interrupt), or to rebuke. 
In every case of usage (deliberating, expecting, demanding, requesting, rewarding, punishing, 
evaluating) there is an underlying mental representation of the rule or norm which serves a 
specific cognitive function.2 With Conte/Castelfranchi (1995, pp. 95-102), I conceptualize the 
underlying mental representation as a belief (doxastic attitude) about an action that agents of 
a specific kind and in a specific situation ought to do (or to omit). The syntax of such beliefs 
shows an if-then-structure, as the logical analysis of rules by Siegwart (2012) and the analysis 
by Conte/Castelfranchi (1995) demonstrate. The conceptual content of mentally representated 
rules and norms appears as a conditionalized action (modalized with a deontic operator). It 
expresses: If agents of the kind A are in situations of the type S, then they ought to do X. 
But this does not mean that rules and norms are mental representations (and nothing else). 
It signals us only that rule- or norm-guided behavior, as well as the use of rules and norms at 
large, requires concept possession. Inasfar the cognitive functions of mentally represented 
rules or norms comes into focus, the mental or cognitive dimension of their existence is 
discussed. One can call this dimension of the existence the cognitive (or subjective) realization 
of rules and norms. Nevertheless, it would be an insufficient and mistaken approach to declare 
that the ontological status of a rule or a norm is that it is a mental representation, or that rules 
and norms can be reduced to mental states. This would be an error because there is actually 
more to a rule or a norm than its realization in people’s heads, as doxastic attitudes. Rules 
and norms are executed via punishment or reward, and they are maintained via the personal 
goals and interests of people. In a word: the existence of rules and norms (as the phenomenon 
of interest) encompasses their bindingness as well as their cognitive realization. A valid 
theoretical concept of the position that rules and norms have in the world (an account on the 
ontological status) must include the whole phenomenon.
In order to frame the existence of a rule or norm as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, I rely 
on central lessons from von Wright (1969; 1971) and Weinberger (1970; 1983; 1985; 2001) who, 
in their days, considered a theory on the existence of norms a background theory for deontic 
logic. Von Wright (1969) concludes that the reality of a norm consists in its being in force. In 
2  In the case of deliberation the mental representation of the rule or norm represents an option for action. In the 
case of expectation the mental representation serves an anticipatoric function. In the case of demanding and 
requesting the mental representation is the phrastic meaning of demands and requests. In the case of sanctioning the 
mental representation serves as the concept with which deviations get identified. In the case of evaluation the mental 
representation serves as the measure with which conduct is measured (as good or bad, befitting or indecent, etc.). 
3. Framing the 
existence of social 
rules and norms
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his Norm and Action (1971 [1963]) von Wright states that the “ontological problem of norms” 
concerns the nature of the facts which make normative statements true (p. 106). But according 
to his proclamation, he felt not at all satisfied with the details of his proposed solution to this 
“extremely difficult problem” (p. viii). Anyhow, the Czech philosopher of law Ota Weinberger 
develops this line of thought in a more sophisticated manner based on an understanding of 
the expression “x exists” as “x has a position in the coming to be and passing away”. He notes 
(1980): “A norm exists in a time interval, i. e. the time interval of its validity” (p. 437).3 To say 
“a norm exists” thus means: As soon as and as long as there is socially organized pressure, 
there is a norm (1988, p. 82). His basic idea precisely is that it – the existence of a norm as a fact 
(in German: das Dasein der Norm) – has two dimensions: the social and the subjective. The social 
dimension encompass the bindingness with all its modes of appearance, e. g. bindingness as a 
social fact and social generated force and pressure. The subjective dimension encompass the 
cognitive realization of norms with all its modes of appearance, e. g. linguistic expressions 
or cognitive functions of that (mentally represented) norm. This framework challenges any 
such approaches to the ontological status which seek to grasp the essence of norms or rules 
in mental states or linguistic expressions. Weinberger (1985) for example disproves such 
attempts showing that an exclusive focus on explicit norm-sentences ignores the roles norms 
have in the pragmatic realm of human existence.
Framing the existence of rules and norms
social aspects, e. g. pragmatic aspects subjective aspects, e. g.
Normativity as a social fact, 
socially generated pressure,
indifference of that norm against 
individual goals and wishes.
Pragmatic roles
(see above)
Cognitive realization as doxastic 
attitudes, propositional attributes 
of these beliefs, cognitive 
functions
I take up Weinberger’s basic idea as follows. The subjective realization of a rule or norm and 
its bindingness are dimensions of their existence. They can be distinguished analytically. But 
actually these dimensions coincide in the pragmatic roles of rules and norms. The use of a 
rule or norm in a pragmatic role implies its cognitive realization in the format of a doxastic 
attitude. But furthermore, a necessary condition for a norm or rule to appear in a pragmatic 
role is its bindingness. The bindingness of a rule or norm is the social dimension of its 
existence. This framework is depicted in the table above. 
In general, the bindingness of rules and norms can be explicated as: In a situation S agents 
of the kind A ought to do X. The essence of bindingness is grasp if the meaning of ought is 
explained as situated particular pressure which is organized socially. In order to explain 
bindingness as a socially organized fact, I rely on Savigny’s analysis (1983, p. 39). A social rule 
or norm, resp. its bindingness, exists iff,
1) the conduct in question is customary,
2) deviations are met with criticism,
3) the deviations are accepted as a justification for criticizing deviations.
Take for example “The guests ought to leave, if the host wants to go to bed”. We can analyze: 
The norm in question exists, if (1) it is customary that the guests leave if the host wants to 
3  My translation. Note that in German the word validity in its practical meaning (Geltung) refers pretty much to the 
meaning of bindingness, and the conceivably practical bearings of the bindingness of a norm is the pressure by which 
it is accompanied.  
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go to bed, (2) to stay meets criticism, (3) the fact that you stayed is accepted as a justification 
for the critique on your behaviour. The conduct for A’s in S to do X is customary if there are 
a habit and tacit consensus about it. Customs such as these are accompanied by (opaque) 
notions on the future conduct of others. There is a common mutual expectation, i. e. each and 
everyone expects from the other that A’s in S will do X (first-order) and everyone expects that 
every other expects that (s)he will do X if (s)he is an A in S (second-order). A disappointment 
of this mutual expectation would cause confusion. Here conditions (2) and (3) apply. For A’s to 
do X in S is binding, if the observed deviant act, i. e. the act which causes confusion, would be 
faced by negative ensuing actions (sanctions) and if these sanctions are considered right by a 
large majority. Consider an angry rebuke as an ensuing action following a deviation, e. g. an 
angry shouting as a reaction to the observation that someone throws garbage onto the street. 
If there is a general consent regarding this angry shouting a proper ensuing reaction to the 
deviant behavior, then there is bindingness. 
Subjectively, bindingness is perceived as pressure. How this pressure comes into being can 
be called the ontological problem of normativity, cf. Stemmer (2008). In particular, pressure 
is a product of the incompatibility of a rule or norm with personal goals. Even in the state 
of greatest liberty, individual action goals are restricted through the potential reactivity of 
fellow people.4 Take again “The guests ought to leave, if the host wants to go to bed”. From 
an individual viewpoint, the norm and the wish to stay although the host wants to go to 
bed (personal goal) are incompatible. What generate the bindingness of a norm thus is the 
potentially negative reaction of other people (e. g. the host) who restrict one’s personal 
goals. The problem of normativity of social rules and norms thus can be solved by taking 
into account the described potential reactivity of the group towards deviations, i. e. the 
counterfactually preserved common readiness to punish deviances. Or, as Stemmer (2008, 
p. 163, pp. 172-175) puts it, very much like Weinberger (1988, p. 82): “A binding rule or norm 
exists as soon as and as long as particular actions (the focal action) are subject to any penalty”. 
Such an enduring and tacitly accepted common reactivity (based on customs) adopts a 
threatening posture for each and everyone, i. e. the rule in question represents a permanent 
restriction of individual action goals. The meaning of ought in these contexts, such as in “You 
ought to keep your position in the queue!”, merely means that a) there is a fellow person who 
expects that you keep your position in the queue,5 and b) there is a objective possibility that 
your deviance will faced with ensuing negative behavior. Apropos, it deserves a mention that 
this social-externalistic organization of bindingness, in general, is a unique feature of social 
rules and norms. In contrast, the bindingness of legal rules or norms (resp. the pressure that 
accompanies them) is organized by the governmental deployed organs in a controlled manner.
In fact, the constituting factors of rule- or norm-bindingness are dispositional attitudes of 
ordinary people, i. e. mutual expectation and contrafactually preserved common readiness 
to punish deviances. Thus, the time interval in which a rule or norm exists (the time interval 
of its bindingness) correlates with the perdurance of these common dispositional attitudes. 
4  In general, social pressure is a product of potential reactivity in group public and individual pursuit of social 
acceptance. The latter is a meta-goal of each individual action (besides the strive for individual well-being). That is 
why there is a general pressure to follow social rules, because, in the long run, continual deviations (as a maxim) 
would slur one’s reputation, and such a lifestyle is in danger to result in social isolation. 
5  The role of the spectator is crucial for the motivational effectiveness of a norm. In our context, the spectator 
is present actually since it is the spectating fellow human. But note that the process of goal adaption, i. e. the 
assimilation of the personal will to the expressed goal in the rule, also applies in cases in which the spectator (who 
expects and whose pleasure is of personal importance) is present virtually, such as in cases of the general will expected 
behind anonymous norms or as in cases of God’s will behind religious norms.  
117
ON THE QUESTION OF HOW SOCIAL RULES AND SOCIAL NORMS EXIST
These socially arranged situations, i. e. the connection of certain conduct with sanctions, are 
genuine subsets of the world. In a word: They are facts. 
What is the connection between the social and the subjective dimension of the existence of 
rules and norms? The factual bindingness of a rule or norm allows us to use it in deliberation, 
expectation, demanding and requesting, rewarding and punishing, and evaluation. 
Furthermore, the mental representations of rules and norms, realized subjectively in 
the format of doxastic attitudes, are conceptual reproductions of such socially arranged 
situations.  What is actually the case – that certain people A in specific situations S ought 
to do X which means that there is a mutual expectation and a common reactivity potential 
towards deviances – what is actually the case that is reproduced mentally (and linguistically), 
represented in the if-clause (agents of the kind A are in a situation S), and in the then-clause (A 
has to act in a m-fashioned manner). 
I developed a framework that includes the subjective, the social and the pragmatic dimension 
of the existence of social rules and norms. The subjective realization of rules and norms 
was explained as a reproduction of the social fact that the corresponding conduct is 
acually binding. Mental representations of rules and norms (linguistically explicit or not) 
serve specific cognitive functions in several constellations of social life: in deliberation, 
in expectation, in demanding and in requesting, in rewarding and in punishing, and in 
evaluating. Furthermore, the above analyses show that the bindingness of social rules and 
norms are constituted by common and mutual expectation and common readiness to punish 
deviances (contrafactually preserved). These dispositions generate what is called “a socially 
arranged situation”, i. e. a state of affairs in which a particular action (the focal action of the 
norm) is subject to any penalty if the norm-adressee fails to act in the corresponding manner. 
The phenomenon of normativity (bindingness) was explained as a social organized restriction 
of personal goals that is perceived subjectively as pressure. 
By this analyses, I demonstrate that all aspects of the existence of social rules and norms can 
be explained merely by referring to dispositional attitudes and mental representations, more 
precise: doxastic attitudes, without denying the social-externalistic sources of normativity. To 
say that a social rule or norm exists thus merely means that there are common dispositional 
attitudes towards certain people in specific situations and that there are common beliefs about 
this. That is their ontological status: They are grounded in common dispositions which are 
mentally realized and epistemically present to the agent’s in some degree. How and why those 
dispositional attitudes are preserved over time, how they can be installed or destroyed, or, in 
other words, how and why social rules and norms persists, how and why the can be succesfully 
proclaimed or dissolved, is indeed another, more sociological and less ontological question.     
REFERENCES
Black, M. (1981). The analysis of rules. In M. Black, Models and metaphors: Studies in language and 
philosophy (7th ed.) (pp. 95-139). Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press; 
Conte, R., & Castelfranchi, C. (2006). The mental path of norms. Ratio Juris, 19(4), 501-517; 
Conte, R., & Castelfranchi, C. (1999). From conventions to prescriptions: Towards an integrated 
view of norms. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 7, 323-340; 
Conte, R. & Castelfranchi, C. (1995). Cognitive and social action. London: University College 
London Press;
Davidson, D. (1980). Actions, reasons and causes. In D. Davidson, Essays on actions and events (pp. 
3-19). Oxford: Oxford University Press;




Peirce, C. S. (1958-1965). Collected papers. Quoted as CP, followed by number of volume and 
paragraph. Cambridge (Mass.): The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press;
Savigny, E. von (1983). Zum Begriff der Sprache. Konvention, Bedeutung, Zeichen. Stuttgart: Reclam; 
Schauer, F. (2002). Playing by the rules: A philosophical examination of rule-based decision-making in 
law and in life (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
Siegwart, G. (2012). Regel. In P. Kolmer & A. Wildfeuer (Eds.), Neues Handwörterbuch 
philosophischer Grundbegriffe (pp. 1864-1874). Freiburg: Karl Alber; 
Siegwart, G. (2010). Agent-Situation-Modus-Handlung. Erläuterungen zu den Komponenten 
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